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Abstract: This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by 
remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their 
actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator 
games, in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff 
consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the 
dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the 
one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to 
unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before 
implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators 
are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions lead to fair outcomes. 
We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair 
outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself 
punished, regardless of the outcome. Models of procedural fairness combining 
ex ante and ex post fairness qualitatively predict the observed punishment 
pattern. 
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“A man is responsible for his ignorance.” – Milan Kundera, Laughable Loves 
1. Introduction  
Many important decisions involve tradeoffs between personal benefits and impacts on the welfare 
of others. In such situations, there is often the possibility of remaining uninformed about how 
one’s actions affect others. Moreover, such “willful ignorance” may provide a justification for 
self-interested behavior. That is, while a decision maker is typically held responsible for 
knowingly committing an action that hurts others, the attribution of responsibility is less clear 
when he acts without knowledge of consequences. Such reasoning may even hold when the 
decision to remain ignorant is made privately, as ignorance allows one to act selfishly without 
direct confrontation with the consequences for others or the associated guilt (Dana et al., 2007). 
Thus, strategically manipulating one’s information about the consequences of one’s actions for 
others provides a path through which ignorance, even when deliberate, might provide insulation 
from responsibility or blame.  
In corporate and political contexts, individuals often present ignorance as an excuse for 
why they should not be held responsible for adverse outcomes that they caused. For example, 
following corporate scandals and fraud, CEOs and board members often excuse their role by 
claiming they were not aware of what took place further down the hierarchy. Examples include 
former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who claimed ignorance about any accounting irregularities at 
the failed firm, and Rupert Murdoch, who was directly accused of showing “willful blindness” 
concerning the phone-hacking practices at News Corporation.2 In the political sphere, public 
officials often argue that being unaware of acts committed by subordinates should exonerate them 
from blame.3 For example, in response to revelations about the NSA’s widespread wiretapping of 
allied leaders’ phones, high-ranking U.S. government officials claimed lack of knowledge that 
these surveillance practices were taking place.4 
Prior research in economics demonstrates that decision makers seize upon strategies to act 
self-interestedly at the expense of others, when presented with opportunities for avoiding blame 

2See http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-02-05/commentary-ken-lays-audacious-ignorance  and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/01/phone-hacking-report-wilful-blindness 
3 In fact, political science has long recognized the ability to avoid blame as an important determinant of a politician’s 
success (Weaver, 1986) and ignorance as a potential strategy to do so (McGraw, 1991). 
4 See http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579162110180138036  


2
or responsibility.5 An important but largely open question, however, is to what extent such 
strategies are, in fact, effective in deflecting blame.6  
Our study directly addresses this issue, by quantifying the extent to which engaging in 
willful ignorance allows a decision maker to deflect external blame for his actions and their 
consequences. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which some participants can 
choose to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions for others and in which other 
participants have the opportunity to impose costly monetary punishments after observing 
behavior and the resulting outcomes. We interpret the assigned punishment as a measure of 
blame and responsibility attribution for an action and its consequences.  
More precisely, in our experiment a dictator plays a binary dictator game under one of 
two possible states of the world. The state of the world is chosen by a random device and 
determines whether an action that is personally beneficial for the dictator benefits or harms the 
receiver. The dictator can decide whether or not to learn the true state, and faces no cost for 
acquiring this information. The realized state is irrelevant for the dictator’s payoffs, meaning that 
ignorance creates no uncertainty about the dictator’s payoffs, but enables the dictator to remain 
ignorant about the effects of his action on others. Thus, our design affords the dictator the 
opportunity to remain willfully ignorant regarding the social consequences of his actions. 
Our focus is not on the effects of willful ignorance per se, however (cf. Dana et al., 2007), 
but instead on the extent to which remaining willfully ignorant allows the dictator to avoid blame 
and responsibility when a bad outcome results for the receiver. Therefore, in our experiment a 
third party observes the actions of the dictator and the outcome of the game and decides whether 
and to what extent to punish the dictator for his behavior.  
Our results show that, when outcomes detrimental to the receiver result, ignorance is 
indeed effective in reducing punishment. That is, when taking an action that increases one’s own 

5 Some research demonstrates that decision makers hide behind uncertainty - both their own and that of others - 
about what outcomes will result or how such outcomes were produced in order to keep more money in a 
distributional context (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ockenfels and Werner, 2012). In some 
cases, this can even mean that people are willing to accept less money in order to forgo the opportunity to share and 
have the other person know that sharing could have taken place  (Broberg et al., 2007; Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et 
al., 2012). Hamman et al. (2010) show that delegating distributive decisions to others similarly provides a 
justification for self-interested behavior. More generally, a growing literature on behavioral ethics (Treviño et al., 
2006; Bazerman and Gino, 2012) seeks to identify factors that influence ethical conduct, often highlighting how 
contextual features can lead otherwise “good” people to feel licensed to act unethically (Mazar et al., 2008; Dana et 
al., 2012).  
6 Experimental research in economics has only recently started to investigate the effectiveness of blame-avoidance 
strategies. For example, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) show that delegating a decision that can lead to an unfair 
allocation is an effective way to shift blame from oneself toward the person to whom the decision is delegated.  
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welfare, but also results in harm to others, it is better to have avoided knowledge that harm would 
occur. Thus, willful ignorance can help avoid blame. 
At the same time, however, we find that willful ignorance itself is evaluated negatively, 
regardless of the consequences. That is, choosing to forgo information concerning the receiver’s 
payoffs and acting in a self-regarding way incites punishment, even when the resulting state of 
the world is one in which the dictator’s self-interest is also beneficial for the receiver. By 
remaining ignorant the dictator shows disregard for the possibility that the receiver may obtain a 
low payoff and this appears sufficient for inducing punishment by third parties. Thus, the mere 
act of avoiding information about how one’s decisions affect others provokes blame and 
punishment.  
As a result of the above two counteracting effects of ignorance on punishment by third 
parties, in expectation, willful ignorance does not yield a higher payoff than knowingly acting 
selfishly. That is, while ignorance provides some blame avoidance when bad outcomes result, the 
fact that its use produces blame even when the outcomes are good makes it an ineffective strategy 
for obtaining higher payoffs in our experiment. 
However, the punishment pattern revealed in our study has important implications for 
how willful ignorance might interact with punishment outside the laboratory. Attention to the 
possibility of blame and punishment is often salient only when bad outcomes arise – e.g., 
following a scandal or harmful misdeed. The fact that decision makers are penalized less when 
acting under willful ignorance therefore suggests that willful ignorance may be a good strategy in 
contexts where punishment is unlikely to be considered absent some noticeably bad consequence. 
Thus, corporate and political leaders who suspect wrongdoing in the institutions they manage 
may, indeed, benefit from a strategy involving willful ignorance. 
Our results also have implications for economic theories of social preferences. We find 
significant differences in punishment for the same outcome, depending on whether the dictator 
revealed the state before making his choice. This cannot be explained by theories that incorporate 
social motives through preferences over final payoff distributions (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which predict the same punishment for an allocation, 
independently of the actions that led to the allocation. The qualitative comparative-static effect of 
willful ignorance on punishment is consistent with theories that incorporate intention-based 
reciprocity as a motive (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006; Sebald, 2010). However, these models fail to predict our additional finding that willfully 

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ignorant dictators are still punished less when the beneficial outcome occurs than when the unfair 
outcome obtains. That is, outcomes matter even for willfully ignorant dictators. 
Research on procedural fairness recognizes that people care not only about distributions 
of final outcomes, but also about the procedures employed to implement outcomes (Frey et al., 
2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012). Our 
study contributes to this literature in that we show that punishment is not determined solely by 
consequences, but also by the process – in our case, the dictator’s decision whether to acquire 
information – that leads to those consequences. Our research thus also relates to recent studies 
that find both ex ante fairness (equal opportunities, fair procedures) and ex post fairness (equal 
payoffs) to influence distributive choices (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; 
Cappelen et al., 2013). We find that simple models combining ex ante and ex post fairness (e.g., 
Brock et al., 2013; Saito, 2013), are able to predict both the qualitative comparative-static effect 
of willful ignorance on the assigned punishment as well as the finding that punishment depends 
on consequences following willful ignorance.  
There exists prior evidence that willful ignorance can be used to obtain more favorable 
wealth distributions, in the context of bilateral bargaining. Building on earlier experiments on 
bilateral bargaining with incomplete information about values, which demonstrated that more 
informed parties extract more favorable payoffs (Roth and Murnighan, 1982), Kagel et al. (1996) 
show that responders in an ultimatum game are willing to accept very unequal monetary payoffs 
more often when the proposer is only partly informed about the receiver’s payoffs than when the 
proposer has complete information. Thus, a party that is ignorant about the consequences of an 
offer for the other party can make less favorable offers. Conrads and Irlenbusch (2013) – using a 
design, like ours, that is motivated by Dana et al. (2007) – confirm that this extends to (willful) 
ignorance: offers to another party by a proposer in an ultimatum bargaining game, who chooses 
to remain ignorant or cannot avoid being ignorant, are accepted more frequently than comparable 
offers by a fully informed proposer. Our first result that willful ignorance deflects punishment for 
low receiver payoffs thus concords with their finding that willful ignorance leads to higher 
acceptance rates of unequal proposals.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental 
design. Section 3 summarizes our results with respect to the observed punishment pattern and the 
dictator’s decisions. Section 4 discusses the predictions of different social preference models 

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regarding the qualitative comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on punishment behavior. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our study uses one-shot binary dictator games that are modified to allow for willful ignorance 
and punishment. In the modified games, there are three players, as well as a move by nature that 
determines payoffs. Nature moves first, implementing one of two payoff states, Ȧ1 or Ȧ2, with 
equal probabilities, i.e., p(Ȧ1) = p(Ȧ2) = 0.5.  
The state determines the relationship between a dictator’s choices and the payoffs of a 
passive receiver, as depicted in Figure 1. More precisely, a dictator chooses between two options, 
a1 and a2. Regardless of the state, the dictator receives a payoff of 70 for choosing a1 and 50 for 
choosing a2. However, the state determines whether or not the dictator’s and receiver’s interests 
are aligned. In Ȧ1, the receiver receives 10 for the dictator’s choice of a1 and 50 for a choice of 
a2. In Ȧ2 the receiver’s payoffs are reversed: 50 for a choice of a1 and 10 for a2. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Dictator’s Choice Options in State Ȧ1 and State Ȧ2. The dictator’s 
monetary payoff is shown in the top row, the receiver’s payoff in the bottom row. 
 
Figure 1 also presents labels that provide an interpretation of the dictator’s actions and 
their consequences, conditional on the realization of a particular state. In state Ȧ1, a choice of a1 
leads to an unfair allocation in that the dictator receives the highest possible payoff and the 
receiver the lowest one. Conversely, a choice of a2 in state Ȧ1 leads to a fair allocation. Thus, in 
Ȧ1 there is a conflict between what is best for the dictator and for the receiver, as in standard 
dictator games. However, this conflict is entirely removed in state Ȧ2. Here a choice of a1 is 

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dominant for a dictator who cares both about her own payoff and that of the receiver, while a2 
leads to a dominated allocation of 50-10.7  
Depending on the treatment, the dictator is either informed about the realized state or not. 
In a baseline condition, the dictator is informed about the state before making a choice. In a 
hidden information condition, he is not initially informed, but he can choose whether to find out 
the state at no cost or remain willfully ignorant. The dictator then chooses between a1 and a2, 
either with or without knowledge of the state.  
Finally, a third party can inflict punishment upon the dictator, after observing the 
dictator’s choices (a1 or a2 and, in the hidden information condition, whether he remained 
ignorant or not), the realized state, and thus the resulting payoffs. Our primary interest is in these 
punishment decisions by third parties who were not directly affected by the dictator’s decision.8  
The third party has an endowment of 50 and can reduce the dictator’s payoff. Punishment 
is costly for the third party. For each unit of own income spent by the third party, the dictator’s 
payoff decreases by 5. Punishment is constrained in that the dictator’s payoff cannot be reduced 
below 10. Thus, for example, if the dictator’s payoff is 70 before punishment, the third party can 
spend any integer amount between 0 and 12 of own income, to deduct up to 60 from the 
dictator’s payoff. If the dictator’s payoff is 50, the third party can spend at most 8 units of own 
income, which decreases the dictator’s payoff by 40.  
Final payoffs are as follows. The dictator receives 70 or 50, depending on her choice of a1 
or a2, minus the punishment assigned by the third party (five times the units of own income spent 
by the third party). The receiver gets either 50 or 10, depending on the dictator’s decision and the 
relevant state. The third party’s payoff is 50 minus the units of own income spent to punish the 
dictator.  
We implemented two treatment conditions that differ only with respect to the information 
that the dictator possesses regarding the state.  

7 We use the labels “fair,” “unfair,” etc. for expositional reasons in the paper. In the experimental instructions, the 
dictator’s choice options were neutrally framed as “Option 1” and “Option 2.” 
8 We use a third-party, instead of a second-party, punishment design, firstly, because we are primarily interested in 
broad social norms of whether willful ignorance serves as an excuse for acting in a self-interested manner and third-
party punishment is often employed to study norm violations; see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Moreover, 
measuring third-party punishment allows observing punishment assignments that are not confounded by income or 
direct reciprocity effects. In contrast to the receiver (i.e., the second party), the third party always has an endowment 
of 50 points, irrespective of the resulting outcome. 

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2.1 Baseline 
In the baseline condition, it is common knowledge that the dictator is informed about the state of 
the world before he makes his decision between a1 and a2. Thus, the dictator is fully aware of 
whether the choice is between the unfair and fair allocations or the dominant and dominated 
ones. To elicit dictator’s complete strategies, we implemented the strategy method. That is, we 
asked each dictator how he would decide if state Ȧ1 were realized and how he would decide if 
state Ȧ2 were realized. Only after the dictator made both choices, he learned the actual realized 
state, and he knew that his choice in this state would be binding. 
The third party was informed (i) about the state of the world and (ii) the dictator’s choice 
in this realized state, and could then assign punishment to decrease the dictator’s payoff. We also 
applied the strategy method to elicit the punishment choices. That is, we asked the third party to 
indicate how much she would deduct from the dictator’s payoff for both possible choices by the 
dictator in both possible states of the world. Only after the third party made her decisions in all 
four possible cases, she learned the state of the world and the dictator’s decision in this state. The 
third party knew that the chosen amount of punishment in the relevant case would be binding. 
 
2.2 Hidden Information 
In the hidden information condition, it is common knowledge that the dictator is initially 
uninformed about the state of the world. Importantly, this uncertainty does not apply to the 
dictator’s own payoffs, which are identical in both states. A choice of a1 gives the dictator 70, 
while a2 gives the dictator 50. Uncertainty thus only applies to the consequences of the two 
choices for the receiver’s payoffs, as described in Figure 1. The dictator has the option to reveal 
the state before making his allocation decision. Ignorance is the default, but revealing is costless 
and implemented by clicking a button on the decision screen.  
If the dictator remains ignorant, he will never be informed about the underlying state of 
the world and he will thus never learn the receiver’s payoff. However, if the dictator reveals, he 
learns the state of the world and chooses either between the unfair and fair allocation in state Ȧ1, 
or between the dominant and dominated allocation in state Ȧ2.9 

9 A basic common feature of our two treatments is that the information about the state of the world is always 
available to a decision maker, and the only difference is that willful ignorance is possible in one treatment but not in 
the other. This allows us to compare the consequences of a dictator’s decision to remain ignorant when she could 
have acquired information, to situations in which the dictator is, either by default or by choice, informed. An 
alternative baseline, in which dictators are never informed, potentially provides insights into how judgments of 
punishment and blame are formed (cf. Gurdal et al., 2013), but departs from our main research question. 

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As in the baseline, we implemented the strategy method to elicit the allocation choices, 
where possible. That is, dictators first decided whether they wanted to acquire the payoff 
information or remain ignorant. If a dictator chose to remain ignorant, he then made a choice 
between a1 and a2, while if the dictator chose to acquire the payoff information, he then indicated 
choices of a1 or a2 for each of the two possible realized states. Only after the dictator made both 
choices, he learned the state of the world; he knew that his choice in this state would be binding.  
The third party was informed of (i) whether or not the dictator revealed the state, (ii) the 
realized state of the world, and (iii) what choice the dictator made, either in ignorance or 
conditional on the realized state. The third party thus knew the state of the world even if the 
dictator chose to remain ignorant. We again used the strategy method to elicit the punishment 
decisions by third parties for all possible states and actions by the dictator. Note that there are 
now eight possible cases, as all four possible allocations can result either after remaining ignorant 
or after revealing.  
 
2.3 General Procedures 
Before subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which 
computer terminal to sit and thus a subject’s role and the group matching. Subjects found paper 
copies of the instructions at their assigned computer terminals. One third of the subjects were 
assigned the role of the dictator (neutrally labeled as “player A”). Two thirds of the subjects read 
in the instructions that they would be either in the role of the receiver (“player B”) or in the role 
of the third party (“player C”). These subjects all made choices as third parties and they learned 
of their actual roles only afterward. If they were assigned the role of the third party, then the 
chosen amount of punishment in the relevant case would be binding. If they were assigned to the 
role of receiver, their decisions would have no impact on the group. This procedure enabled us to 
elicit punishment decisions, which are the focus of this paper, from two thirds of our subjects.10  
We conducted four sessions of the baseline condition, with 81 subjects in total (27 
subjects in the role of the dictator and 54 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party). We also 
conducted four sessions of the hidden information condition, with 90 subjects in total (30 
subjects in the role of the dictator and 60 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party).  

10Note that this design choice, while eliminating strategic concerns for third parties, might place third parties 
mentally in the role of the receivers when making their punishment decisions. Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2014) 
compared a punishment protocol like ours to a protocol where the role of the third party was known in advance. They 
found a greater demand for punishment when roles were assigned ex post but, importantly, this effect was constant 
across treatments and thus did not influence treatment effects. 

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All sessions took place at the decision laboratory of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich in June 2012. The experiments were computerized with the software “z-
Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007) and the recruitment was conducted with the software “ORSEE” 
(Greiner, 2003). Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were 
not eligible to participate. Each subject participated in only one experimental condition. Subjects’ 
instructions included comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before the 
experiment could begin. A summary of the instructions was read aloud to ensure common 
information regarding the instructions. An English translation of the original German instructions 
for the hidden information condition can be found in the online Appendix B. Sessions lasted 
about 50 to 60 minutes. Payoffs from the game, denominated in “points,” were converted into 
money at the rate of 2 points to CHF 1 (about $1 at the time of the experiment) at the end of the 
experiment. On average, subjects earned CHF 39.80 in the baseline sessions and CHF 41.30 in 
the hidden information sessions. These amounts include a show-up fee of CHF 15.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Punishment Pattern 
The focus of this paper is the pattern of punishment for dictator allocation choices by third 
parties. Our particular interest is in studying how the dictator’s choice to either remain ignorant 
or become informed about the receiver’s payoffs influences punishment. 
Figure 2 shows the average punishment that was assigned to the dictator for the different 
realized allocations in the baseline and in the hidden information condition.11 The exact values 
can be read from Table 1. For instance, the left black bar in Figure 2 shows that the dictator 
receives a deduction of 19.72 points, on average, if he chooses the unfair allocation in state Ȧ1 in 
the baseline condition.  
In accordance with prior findings on third-party punishment (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004), the figure shows that the dictators are punished significantly more for knowingly 
implementing the unfair allocation than for the fair allocation. This holds true in the baseline and 
when the dictator chose to acquire the information in the hidden information condition. When 
dictators remained ignorant, the difference in punishment for implementing the unfair vs. fair 

11 Averages are calculated including observations with zero punishment, i.e., we report unconditional averages. 

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allocation was smaller, but also statistically significant. Thus, regardless of the dictator’s 
knowledge or willful ignorance of the consequence to the receiver, a choice that results in an 
unfair allocation is punished more relative to one that results in a fair one (p<0.01 in all three 
comparisons, using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).12  
 
 
 
 
Our data show, however, that willful ignorance mitigates the punishment received by a 
dictator whose actions result in the unfair allocation. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 
70 points for himself is punished significantly less if the unfair allocation realizes (11.42) 
compared to a dictator who directly chooses the unfair allocation when the consequences are 
known – i.e., after revealing (16.25) or in the baseline condition (19.72) (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.014, respectively).13 Thus, our experiment reveals 
that willful ignorance can mitigate some of the blame and punishment received when knowingly 
implementing unfair outcomes. 

12 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. 
13 We do not find that revealing the state is treated differently from exogenously knowing the state. A comparison of 
the punishment for a dictator who reveals in the hidden information condition with the punishment in the baseline 
condition, where the dictator knows the state of the world by default, reveals no significant differences (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests, p=0.331, p=0.743, p=0.900, and p=0.196, for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, respectively). 
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Figure 2: Average Punishment of the Dictator by the Third Party. The significance of the 
difference in punishment is indicated by the p-values of the respective non-parametric tests 
(signed-rank or rank-sum). All four comparisons between Baseline and Hidden Info – Revealed 
are insignificant.
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Result 1: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished less for implementing an unfair 
outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. Willful 
ignorance thus deflects blame for unfair outcomes. 
However, the opposite pattern emerges when one considers what happens in cases where 
the resulting allocation is the dominant one, which is favorable to both the dictator and the 
receiver. Here, willfully ignorant dictators are punished significantly more (8.00) compared with 
dictators who choose the same dominant allocation after revealing (2.76) or in the baseline 
condition (1.76) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.034, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.039, 
respectively). Thus, willful ignorance itself appears to receive blame and punishment, even when 
it results in an outcome favorable to everyone.  
Result 2: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished more for implementing a 
dominant outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. 
Willful ignorance is thus inherently blameworthy. 
Due to this opposing effect of willful ignorance on punishment, the difference in 
punishment between the unfair and the dominant allocation is much smaller when the dictator 
remained ignorant (3.42) than when he revealed the state in the hidden information condition 
(13.58) or in the baseline (17.96). Nevertheless, all three differences are highly significant 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p<0.01).  
Result 3: Dictators, including willfully ignorant ones, are punished more if an 
unfair outcome is implemented than if a dominant outcome is implemented. 
Outcomes thus matter for punishment even under willful ignorance. 
We observe a similar pattern when a dictator chooses 50 for himself. In accordance with 
Result 1, if the choice is made under willful ignorance and the dominated allocation is 
implemented, the dictator is punished significantly less (6.00) compared to a dictator who 
chooses dominated after revealing (9.50) or in the baseline condition (12.41) (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p=0.029 and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.011, respectively). However, the willfully 
ignorant dictator is punished significantly more if the fair allocation realizes (4.42) compared to a 
dictator who chooses fair after revealing (0.58) or in the baseline condition (0.56) (Wilcoxon 

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signed-rank test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, respectively).14 This finding 
confirms Result 2. The difference in punishment between the fair and the dominated allocation is 
again much smaller when the dictator remained ignorant than when he revealed the state in the 
hidden information condition or in the baseline condition (1.59 vs. 8.92 and 11.85, respectively). 
This difference is at least marginally significant in all three cases (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, 
p=0.052, p<0.01 and p<0.01, respectively), which is consistent with Result 3. 
To summarize, we find a consistent comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on 
punishment. On the one hand, for resulting allocations that yield the receiver the low payoff of 
10, the dictator is punished significantly less when he remained ignorant than when he had the 
payoff information (Result 1). On the other hand, for allocations that are beneficial to the receiver 
– i.e., when the receiver gets the high payoff of 50 – the dictator is punished significantly more 
when he remained ignorant (Result 2). Willful ignorance thus deflects blame and punishment for 
socially “bad” outcomes (the unfair or the dominated allocation). The fact that the dictator did 
not know for sure that the receiver would get a low payoff appears to serve, to some extent, as an 
acceptable excuse. At the same time, willful ignorance is regarded as blameworthy in itself. A 
willfully ignorant dictator is punished significantly more than a dictator who reveals or a dictator 
in the baseline condition when the receiver experiences no harm (in either the fair or the 
dominant allocation). Remaining ignorant means that the dictator shows some disregard for the 
possibility of the receiver obtaining a low payoff, and this appears sufficient for inducing 
punishment by third parties. Finally, we observe that outcomes matter (Result 3). Dictators 
always receive more punishment when their actions yield the disadvantageous outcome for the 
receiver, regardless of the information possessed or acquired by the dictator. 
A similar pattern to the one that we observe in punishment levels also emerges when we 
look at the comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on the frequency of punishment, 
presented in Table 1. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses a1 and a payoff of 70 for himself 
is punished less often if the unfair allocation results (38 percent), compared to a dictator who 
reveals (53 percent) or to the baseline condition (61 percent) (McNemar test, p=0.012, and 

14 As we report below, willfully ignorant dictators never chose 50 points for themselves. Also, none of the dictators 
who revealed chose dominated in state Ȧ2. In the baseline condition, only one dictator chose dominated. While we 
call the allocation (50-10) “dominated,” the fact that one subject chose it highlights the possibility that it could 
alternatively be labeled “spiteful” or “competitive” because it maximizes the relative payoff advantage of the 
dictator. Punishment for a dictator who learns that the state of the world isȦ2 and nevertheless chooses (50-10) could 
thus be driven by third parties who want to sanction “spiteful” or “competitive” dictators. We thank a referee for 
suggesting this interpretation. 
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Fischer exact test, p=0.024, respectively). Conversely, if the dominant allocation results, a 
willfully ignorant dictator is punished more frequently (27 percent versus 13 percent, in both 
cases) (McNemar test, p=0.039, and Fischer exact test, p=0.101, respectively).15 Similarly, a 
willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 50 for himself is punished more often if the fair 
allocation results and less often if the dominated allocation results, compared to a dictator who 
reveals or to the baseline condition, though the difference is not significant in all cases 
(McNemar tests, p=0.012 and p=0.180, and Fisher exact tests, p=0.010 and p=0.021, 
respectively).16  
 
Table 1: Punishment Behavior by Experimental Condition 
 Average Punishment Frequency of Punishment 
 Baseline 
Hidden Info 
- Revealed 
Hidden Info 
- Ignorant Baseline
Hidden Info 
- Revealed 
Hidden Info 
- Ignorant 
unfair (70-10) 19.72     16.25       11.42  0.61 0.53 0.38 
fair (50-50) 0.56      0.58        4.42  0.04 0.05 0.20 
dominant (70-50) 1.76      2.67        8.00        0.13 0.13 0.27 
dominated (50-10) 12.41     9.50        6.00  0.50 0.37 0.28 
 
Results 1 and 2 are further illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows the individual third 
parties’ punishment assignments in the hidden information condition when either the unfair 
allocation (left panel) or the dominant allocation (right panel) is realized. Circles above (below) 
the 45-degree line indicate greater (lower) punishment by third parties of dictators who revealed 
the state before choosing an allocation than of dictators who remained willfully ignorant. The 
numbers in the circles indicate the number of observations; circles without numbers represent one 
observation. For instance, when the unfair allocation realized, 27 third parties punished neither a 
willfully ignorant dictator nor a dictator who revealed the state of the world. Providing further 
support for the punishment pattern we observed earlier, of those third parties who did punish the 
unfair allocation, the majority assigned greater punishment to a dictator who revealed the state 
than to a willfully ignorant dictator. The pattern is reversed when the dominant allocation 

15 In the Appendix we report the results of a hurdle model to address the question whether the effects of willful 
ignorance on average punishment levels are driven by different frequencies of punishment or different levels 
conditional on punishment taking place. The analysis suggests that differences in frequencies primarily drive our 
results.  
16 Consistent with our observation on levels of punishment (see footnote 13), there is no difference in the frequency 
of punishment between the baseline and the hidden information conditions when the dictator reveals the payoff 
information (Fisher exact tests, p=0.451, p=1, p=1, p=0.186 for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, respectively).

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realizes: the majority of those third parties who punished assigned more punishment to a willfully 
ignorant dictator than to a dictator who revealed the state.17 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Individual Third Party’s Punishment Assignment for the Unfair and Dominant 
Allocation Depending on the Dictator’s Choice to either Reveal or Remain Ignorant. 
 
3.2 Expected Payoffs of Dictators 
We now turn to the dictators’ expected payoffs for different strategies. There are four choice 
strategies in the baseline conditions, based on the two possible realized states and the two 
possible actions in each state. Because there is no uncertainty, these strategies are identified by 
the resulting outcomes (see Figure 1): {unfair, dominant}, {fair, dominant}, {unfair, dominated}, 
and {fair, dominated}. In the hidden information condition, the dictator can choose to either 
reveal the payoff information – in which case the same four strategies as in the baseline become 
available – or to remain willfully ignorant, in which case the two unconditional action choices, a1 
or a2, are available. Table 2 shows the dictators’ average expected payoffs, based on the 
punishment behavior of third parties, for each of these possible strategies.  
Our main interest is in the effect of the dictator’s choice to remain ignorant on his 
expected payoff. We first compare the strategies that select the same allocations. In this regard, 

17 We can also connect the behavior of individual third parties across realized allocations (i.e., across the two panels 
of Figure 3). Table A.2 in the online Appendix A presents the punishment patterns of individual third parties across 
the two outcomes and reveals that we observe similar patterns, at the individual level, that we find on aggregate. 
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there is little difference between the expected payoffs of a dictator who chooses to remain 
ignorant and selects action a1 (60.29) and either a dictator in the baseline (59.26) or a dictator 
who reveals the payoff information and selects action a1 regardless of the realized state (60.54).18  
 
Table 2: Expected Payoffs of Dictators under Different Strategies 
 
Baseline 
Hidden Information 
 Revealed Ignorant 
{unfair, dominant}   (a1| Ȧ1) (a1| Ȧ2) 59.26 60.54  
{fair, dominant}       (a2| Ȧ1) (a1| Ȧ2) 58.84 58.38  
{unfair, dominated} (a1| Ȧ1) (a2| Ȧ2) 43.94 47.13  
{fair, dominated}     (a2| Ȧ1) (a2| Ȧ2) 43.52 44.96  
{unfair / dominant}  (a1) -  60.29 
{fair / dominated}    (a2) -  44.79 
 
We can also compare the strategy of remaining ignorant and selecting a1 to revealing and 
acting fairly in the hidden information condition or in the baseline condition (i.e., giving the 
receiver a payoff of 50, regardless of the state). These are the most frequently chosen strategies 
(see Section 3.3). While the differences are small, the expected payoff of remaining ignorant and 
playing a1 (60.29) is significantly higher than the expected payoff of either of these two other 
strategies (58.38 and 58.84; respectively, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p<0.01). The observation of very small payoff differences reflects our finding that 
willful ignorance has two countervailing effects on punishment, described in Results 1 and 2.  
 
3.3 Dictators’ Strategies and Resulting Allocations 
Finally, we consider the dictators’ information acquisition decisions in the hidden information 
condition, as well as their allocation choices in both conditions.  
In the baseline, 33 percent of dictators (9 of 27) chose the action a1 regardless of the state, 
which corresponds to the allocations {unfair, dominant}. Almost twice as many, or 63 percent 
(17 of 27), chose the strategy that gave the receiver a payoff of 50 in either stage – e.g., a2 in state 
Ȧ1 and a1 in state Ȧ2, or {fair, dominant}. One subject chose action a2 in state Ȧ2, implementing 

18 The difference is marginally statistically significant in the first comparison (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.075) but 
not in the second (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.137). For all statistical tests in this subsection, we generate a 
distribution of payoffs, for each strategy, using the empirical punishment behavior of the third parties. 
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{fair, dominated}. This overall pattern of behavior is in line with earlier results on dictator games 
with punishment.19 
In the hidden information condition, 43 percent of dictators (13 of 30) remained ignorant 
about the consequences of their decision for the receiver.20 All of the dictators who remained 
ignorant chose action a1 {unfair / dominant}. Of those dictators who revealed the state, 12 
percent (2 of 17) choose a1 unconditionally {unfair, dominant} and 88 percent (15 of 17) choose 
a2 in state Ȧ1 and a1 in state Ȧ2 {fair, dominant}. Dictators who revealed the state thus chose the 
fair allocation in state Ȧ1 in the large majority of the cases, indicating that they reveal the state 
primarily in order to condition their allocation choice on the state of the world.  
The dictators’ strategies resulted in different frequencies of the possible allocations in the 
two conditions. In the baseline, when state Ȧ1 realized, 33 percent of dictators (9 of 27) chose the 
unfair allocation. The unfair allocation resulted with higher frequency (50 percent, or 15 of 30) in 
the hidden information condition. In state Ȧ2, the dominant allocation resulted almost universally 
in both the hidden information (30 of 30 cases) and baseline conditions (26 of 27 cases).  
The fact that unfair allocations result more frequently under hidden information than in 
the baseline resembles the findings in Dana et al. (2007). In their experiment, hidden information 
increased the frequency of the unfair allocation from 26 to 63 percent. The interpretation of Dana 
et al. is that the possibility to remain ignorant gives subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave 
self-interestedly. While similar in direction, the effect in our experiment is much smaller and not 
statistically significant (Fisher exact test, p=0.284). Of course, a key difference between the two 
experiments is the presence of a punishment stage in our design. The threat of punishment alone 
potentially limits the extent to which subjects are willing to act as if willful ignorance absolves 
them of responsibility. As we see, third parties still hold dictators responsible for their 
ignorance.21   

19 In Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), for instance, 63 percent of dictators selected a fair allocation in a binary 
dictator game with punishment that is comparable to our game if state Ȧ1 prevails. 
20 This percentage almost exactly matches the 44 percent of dictators who remained ignorant in Dana et al. (2007). 
21 Moreover, while in Dana et al., subjects who remained willfully ignorant never found out about the consequences 
for the receiver, dictators in our experiment received a “punishment signal” about the realized state of the world, due 
to the fact that third parties punished differently when the unfair allocation resulted than when the result was the 
dominant allocation. Thus, dictators lost some of the benefit of remaining ignorant, due to the information conveyed 
by punishment. 

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4. How Well do Social Preference Models Account for the Results? 
In this paper, we ask the empirical question whether willful ignorance can reduce punishment for 
a dictator who implements an unfair allocation. Our goal was not to design an experiment to 
distinguish between different behavioral models of punishment and social preferences. However, 
it is nevertheless instructive to discuss the qualitative predictions of some leading models in the 
literature regarding the impact of the dictator’s choice to remain willfully ignorant on the 
punishment by the third party. Note first that the canonical model of pure self-interest predicts no 
punishment at all, because it is costly. This prediction is clearly inconsistent with the data.  
 
4.1 Outcome-Based Models of Social Preferences 
Outcome-based models of social preferences introduce utility considerations over parties’ final 
payoffs. For example, two leading models assume that people may dislike payoff inequalities 
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In the spirit of these models, 
suppose that the third party’s punishment decisions are driven by the ex post payoff difference 
between the dictator and the receiver. Consistent with the punishment motive “ex post 
inequality,” we observe higher punishment for allocations with higher final inequality (Result 3). 
For a given allocation, however, the punishment motive “ex post inequality” does not predict a 
difference based on how that allocation was produced. Our main findings (Results 1 and 2) do 
not support this prediction. 
 
4.2 Intention-Based Models of Social Preferences 
A key feature of a second class of models (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; 
Sebald, 2010) is that players respond to the perceived intent (kind or unkind) of other players but 
not to realized ex post payoffs. The kindness of a player is typically evaluated relative to a fair 
“reference” payoff—e.g., the average between the highest and the lowest efficient payoff that a 
player can grant another player. A player’s action is perceived as kind (unkind) if he believes that 
his action choice gives the other player more (less) than such a reference payoff. In the spirit of 
these models, we assume that the dictator’s kindness toward the receiver drives the third parties’ 
punishment decisions.22  

22 The psychological content of models of intention-based reciprocity is that unkindness triggers a reaction “in kind,” 
i.e., punishment. While these models formally capture bilateral interactions, the third party in our experiment is not 
directly affected by the dictator’s choices. Hence, our assumption that a third party’s punishment decisions are driven 

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Consider the dictator’s choice of the unfair allocation (70-10) in state Ȧ1 in the baseline or 
after revealing in the hidden information condition. The implementation of the unfair allocation 
is unkind because it leaves the receiver with less than the reference payoff of 30 (the average of 
the receiver’s highest and lowest possible payoff of 50 and 10, respectively). Second, the 
implementation of the fair allocation (50-50) in state Ȧ1 in the baseline or after revealing in the 
hidden information condition is kind. Finally, remaining willfully ignorant leads to a lottery over 
the receiver’s payoff with an expected payoff of 30, regardless of whether the dictator chooses a1 
or a2, which is neither kind nor unkind since it corresponds precisely to the reference payoff. 
Qualitatively, the punishment motive “intent” thus correctly predicts Results 1 and 2. The same 
prediction pattern prevails in state Ȧ2. However, the punishment motive “intent” cannot explain 
Result 3. After the decision to remain ignorant, the finally resulting allocation should not 
influence the third party’s evaluation of the dictator’s kindness and thus not affect punishment.23 
 
4.3 Models of procedural fairness 
Models of procedural fairness assume people care not only about outcomes but also about the 
procedures that lead to these outcomes (Frey et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; 
Krawczyk, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013; Saito, 
2013). An important example of such a procedure is the notion of “equal opportunities” which 
can be interpreted as the idea that not only ex post realized payoff differences are important but 
also ex ante expected payoff differences.  
 Simple models of procedural fairness are suggested by, e.g., Brock et al. (2013) or Saito 
(2013), who extend the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model to allow for a convex combination of ex 
ante and ex post payoff comparisons. Suppose the third party’s punishment decisions are driven 
by such a convex combination of ex ante and ex post payoff differences between the dictator and 
the receiver and sufficient weight is placed on both ex ante and ex post payoff differences. 

by the dictator’s unkindness towards the receiver is not formally in line with these models. Third-party punishment is 
typically associated with norm enforcement. In that sense, one can argue that the psychological content of models of 
intention-based reciprocity captures the norm that one should not be unkind, and the willingness to punish violations 
of this norm. A similar line of argument can be made regarding our assumption that the inequality between the 
dictator and the receiver drives the third party’s punishment in the models discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.  
23 The hybrid model of outcome- and intention-based social preferences by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) makes the 
same qualitative prediction in our context. In their model, a player is considered as unkind if he implements an 
allocation that favors him in expectation. The expectation is taken at the player’s decision node, so that remaining 
ignorant can again be treated as granting the reference payoff, as in the model by Sebald (2010).

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Consider first the third party’s evaluation of ex ante payoff differences. If the unfair 
allocation (70-10) results in state Ȧ1 in the baseline or after revealing in the hidden information 
condition, the ex ante payoff difference is 60. Since the ex ante payoff difference in case of a 
willfully ignorant dictator who chose a1 is only 40, the model qualitatively predicts Result 1. If 
the fair allocation (50-50) results in state Ȧ1 in the baseline or after revealing in the hidden 
information condition, the ex ante payoff difference is zero. Since the ex ante payoff difference is 
20 in case of a willfully ignorant dictator who chose a2, the model also qualitatively predicts 
Result 2. The same qualitative prediction pattern prevails in state Ȧ2. Moreover, since ex post 
payoff differences are accounted for as well, qualitatively, the model also correctly predicts 
Result 3.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies how the opportunity to remain willfully ignorant – by avoiding information on 
the consequences of one’s actions for others – affects the extent to which individuals are held 
accountable and punished by third parties for the resulting outcomes. Discussions of 
responsibility in political and corporate scandals are often accompanied by claims of ignorance 
that could have been resolved if the involved parties had sought out the relevant information. It is 
important, therefore, to understand whether such strategies are effective for deflecting blame and 
punishment. 
 Our findings reveal an interesting pattern. By remaining willfully ignorant, decision 
makers deflect some punishment when bad consequences arise, due to the fact that something 
good could have happened. Conversely, when good outcomes result from decisions made under 
willful ignorance, the fact that less desirable outcomes could have obtained provides grounds for 
punishment. But even under willful ignorance, punishment is still higher when bad consequences 
arise than when good outcomes result. Such punishment behavior by third parties is consistent 
with behavioral social preference models that combine ex ante and ex post fairness concerns.  
For dictators in our experiment, willful ignorance is not a better strategy, in expectation, 
than acquiring payoff information. This is mainly because the third parties punish willful 
ignorance even when fortune produces a favorable outcome for the receiver. Nevertheless, the 
detected punishment pattern may have very different consequences outside the laboratory, where 
attention to the possibility of punishing someone is often salient only when bad outcomes arise. 

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In such situations, our finding that decision makers receive lighter sanctions for bad outcomes 
suggests that willful ignorance may be an effective strategy for circumventing blame and 
punishment outside the laboratory. 
Interestingly, in many legal systems the “equal culpability” doctrine permits defendants 
who acted under willful ignorance of the existence of a fact to be treated as if they had possessed 
actual knowledge of its existence (Marcus, 1993; Husak and Callender, 1994).24 While this 
observation might suggest that the law is in contradiction with people's common moral sense, as 
elicited in our experiment, one important difference between our experimental environment and 
the one governed by the legal system is that the former is a one-shot interaction while the latter is 
a repeated game. Deterrence of future offenses is one main function of punishment under the law, 
and if ignorance were a valid excuse in the law, this deterrence function would be undermined. In 
contrast, a deterrence motive was absent in our experimental one-shot setting.   
 A final aspect of our experimental design worth stressing is that information acquisition 
was costless for dictators. Thus, both in the baseline as well as in the hidden information 
condition, the relevant information was available to the dictator at no cost; the dictator merely 
had the opportunity to avoid seeing it in the latter condition. If information acquisition were, 
instead, costly, this might enhance the moral justification for remaining ignorant. For example, 
following the 2008 financial crisis, many individuals and institutions involved in the sale of 
deceptively valued and marketed investment products tried to deflect responsibility with the 
claim that these products were too difficult to understand, i.e., they implicitly referred to the cost 
of being fully informed.25 Of course, as the cost of becoming informed increases it becomes, at 
some point, inefficient or even impossible for decision makers to become informed about the 
consequences of their actions. Hence, in some cases, ignorance may be a valid excuse for not 
considering the consequences of one’s actions, though uncertainty and asymmetric information 
about these costs may complicate such considerations. These issues raise interesting questions for 
future research.  
  

24For example, a defendant who was hired by a stranger to drive a car across the United States boarder and who 
claimed not to have had knowledge of the drugs that were hidden in the car was held liable to the same extent as he 
would have been had he had that knowledge (United States v. Jewell).
25 See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/business/12crime.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th 
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Appendix 
Regression analyses 
Table A.1 reports the results of regression analyses to complement the non-parametric tests 
reported in the paper. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS and Tobit regressions of the punishment 
level on dummy variables of the dictator’s decisions in the different treatments. Since the 
dictator’s choices might affect the likelihood and amount of punishment differently, columns (3a) 
and (3b) report estimates from a hurdle model, an econometric specification that treats the 
decision to punish and the amount of punishment as two separate stochastic processes.26 The last 
column reports the number of observations underlying the estimation in column (3b). 
The omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the fair allocation in the baseline 
condition. The first three dummy variables measure the difference between the omitted category 
(fair) and the three other possible allocations (unfair, dominant, and dominated) in the baseline 
condition. For all three comparisons, regressions (1) and (2) show a significant and positive 
difference with the exception of the comparison between the fair and dominant allocations in the 
OLS model. The hurdle model reveals that the unfair, dominant and dominated allocations are 
punished significantly more often than the fair allocation. But conditional on punishment 
occurring, there is no significant difference in the punishment amount between the fair allocation 
and the other three allocations (the coefficients are often large in magnitude, but the large 
standard errors reflect the very limited punishment of the fair allocation in the baseline, where 
only two subjects chose positive punishment).  
The next four dummy variables measure the difference between the baseline and the 
hidden information condition when the dictator reveals the state. In all four regressions, none of 
the four coefficients is significant, which confirms our previous finding that the punishment 
pattern for a dictator who reveals is the same as the pattern in the baseline condition.  
Finally, the last four dummy variables measure the difference in punishment for a given 
allocation between a dictator who reveals and a dictator who remains ignorant in the hidden 
information condition. The OLS and Tobit regressions show significant differences in all four 
comparisons consistent with the directional results in our main analysis. The hurdle model again 

26 First, a standard probit model estimates the likelihood that a third party will punish the dictator; second, a 
truncated linear regression estimates the conditional likelihood of a third party punishing a certain amount 
(McDowell, 2003; see, also, Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis (2011) for an example of where hurdle models are 
used with experimental data). The hurdle is crossed if a third party decides to punish.  
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reveals that these differences are driven by the frequencies of punishment, though the coefficients 
in regression (3b) are often large in magnitude and their sign indicates that the amount is 
influenced in the same direction as the decision to punish. 
 
Table A.1: Regression Analyses 
 
OLS   
(1) 
Tobit     
(2) 
Hurdle model  
  
Probability 
(3a) 
Amount 
(3b) 
# obs. with 
positive 
punishment
unfair (70-10) 19.17*** 70.55*** 0.66*** 30.65 33 
(2.92) (12.09) (0.11) (20.55)  
dominant (70-50) 1.20 20.85** 0.21** -4.31 7 
(0.78) (9.96) (0.09) (20.70)  
dominated (50-10) 11.85*** 58.64*** 0.57*** 20.18 27 
(2.06) (11.70) (0.11) (20.18)  
HI × unfair (70-10) -3.47 -6.21 -0.06 -2.34 32 
(3.93) (6.69) (0.08) (5.88)  
HI × dominant (70-50) 0.91 2.55 0.01 16.02 8 
(1.29) (9.59) (0.10) (12.81)  
HI × dominated (50-10) -2.91 -8.80 -0.11 1.69 22 
(2.83) (6.84) (0.07) (5.65)  
HI × fair (50-50) 0.03 3.93 0.05 -11.16 3 
(0.61) (13.86) (0.13) (24.70)  
HI × ignorant × unfair (70-10) -4.83*** -11.20*** -0.12*** -0.92 23 
(1.26) (2.88) (0.04) (4.29)  
HI × ignorant × dominant (70-50) 5.33** 19.51** 0.16** 15.97 16 
(2.10) (7.75) (0.07) (10.66)  
HI × ignorant × dominated (50-10) -3.50*** -9.15** -0.07* -7.90 17 
(1.29) (3.88) (0.04) (5.05)  
HI × ignorant × fair (50-50) 3.83*** 28.82*** 0.26*** 26.77 12 
(1.38) (9.84) (0.09) (18.68)  
Constant 0.56 -59.92*** - -0.78 2 
(0.47) (12.16)  (21.39)  
Observations 696 696 696 202 202
(Pseudo) R2 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.11  
Notes: The dependent variable in regression (1), (2) and (3b) is the size of the punishment reduction 
received by a dictator. The dependent variable in regression (3a) is a dummy that equals 1 if the third 
party punishes. “Probability” reports the marginal effects from a probit regression calculated at the mean. 
“Amount” is a linear regression truncated at 0. The omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the 
fair allocation in the baseline condition. “HI” indicates the hidden information condition. Robust standard 
errors clustering at the subject level are reported in parentheses.  
*** denote significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
